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 MATCHING EXTERNALITIES AND INVENTIVE PRODUCTIVITY 
  
Robert Hunt 




This paper generalizes and extends the labor market search and matching model of 
Berliant, Reed, and Wang (2006). In this model, the density of cities is determined 
endogenously, but the matching process becomes more efficient as density increases. As 
a result, workers become more selective in their matches, and this raises average 
productivity (the intensive margin). Despite being more selective, the search process is 
more rapid so that workers spend more time in productive matches (the extensive 
margin). The effect of an exogenous increase in land area on productivity depends on the 
sensitivity of the matching function and congestion costs to changes in density. 
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Introduction 
In Carlino, Chatterjee, and Hunt (2006), we argue that the inventive output of cities may 
be explained in part by the nature of worker interactions within firms. Our intuition 
follows from a robust correlation between patent intensity (patents per capita) and job 
density (jobs per square mile) that we report in regressions using a cross-section of 280 
U.S. cities over the 1990s. All else equal, a doubling of job density results in a 20 percent 
increase in patenting per capita. The effect of job density on inventive productivity is 
about the same as the effect of city size (measured in jobs) that is more typically 
examined in the literature. 
A formalization of this intuition is found in the labor market search model of 
Berliant, Reed, and Wang (2006), hereafter BRW. In their model, workers produce only 
in teams, which we can think of as firms. Workers are heterogeneous in their knowledge, 
and the productivity of firms depends on the combination of workers that agree to work 
together.  
Using this set-up, BRW find that the presence of more workers has two effects on 
productivity. First, with more workers, the opportunity cost of searching for a good 
partner is lower because the average amount of time required to find an acceptable 
partner is lower. This is true even though workers are more selective about who they 
match with. As a result, the average productivity of matches is higher. In addition, since 
the average duration of search is lower, a higher proportion of the workforce is matched 
at any given time. Thus the model suggests implications for both the extensive and 
intensive margins. 
In this paper, we develop a more general version of their model and derive a 
number of comparative static results. We extend BRW in several ways. We assume a 
more general production function for inventions. We also allow for consumption 
amenities that influence the equilibrium size of cities. Finally, we characterize the effect 
of an exogenous increase in land area on city population and inventive output.   
The Model 
Time is continuous. Workers live forever and discount consumption at the rate r. A 
measure N of these workers decides to live in the city because the increase in their 
income, plus utility derived from the available local public goods, exceeds the utility lost 
to the effects of congestion (including higher rents and taxes). Once located in the city, 
workers meet randomly and decide whether to match in order to engage in R&D that 
results in inventions. If the agents agree to match, the match may continue indefinitely, 
but all matches are subject to a constant dissolution rate π . Workers consume equal 
shares of the resulting output, and their resulting utility is linear in the output consumed.  
The output generated in a match depends on the characteristics of the workers 
matched together. Workers are differentiated in terms of the variety of knowledge they 
possess. Agents’ types are distributed uniformly along a circle of unit circumference. The 
most productive matches occur with an intermediate degree of heterogeneity. We focus 
on the properties of the unique symmetric stationary equilibrium of the game.  
In steady state, a measure of agents  [0, ] M N ∈  will already be matched and a 
corresponding measure UNM =− will engage in search for a new partner. In a given Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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match, workers produce inventions at the rate () . Ayx ⋅  A is a scalar that reflects the 
overall productivity of the city.1  Match-specific output depends on the Euclidean 
distance x between the type of an agent’s ideal partner and location of his actual partner. 
BRW assume  () yx is a linear, decreasing function of x. Here, we assume that 
expected output  () yx   is continuous, differentiable, and strictly log concave. This implies 
that output falls more and more rapidly as we continue to increase x.2 To simplify the 
analysis, we also assume that matches between identical agents are unproductive.3  BRW 
make a comparable assumption, but they show that the results are qualitatively the same 
when this assumption is violated, or if, instead, it is assumed that output is maximized by 
matching among identical agents.  
Unmatched workers engage in search for a new partner. The arrival rate of 
meetings between unmatched workers follows a Poisson process. In BRW, the meeting 
hazard rate is simply  . U µ α =⋅ 4 The exogenous parameter α  is a measure of the 
efficiency of the meeting technology, which in turn may depend on the time required to 
travel to meeting places, the depth of the labor market, or both. 
Workers cannot recognize each other’s type until after they meet, and this implies 
that not all meetings result in matches. The probability that a meeting results in a match 
will depend on the selectivity of workers, which in turn depends on the opportunity cost 
of declining to form a match in the current meeting. In a symmetric equilibrium, agents 
will agree to match with any agent whose type is sufficiently close to the ideal, i.e., where 
, x δ ≤  where δ  is endogenously determined. Agents choose the value of δ  that equates 
the output from the marginal match with the flow value of rejecting the match and 
waiting for the next encounter:  ( ) U Ay rV δ = . Let  (, ) U β δ  denote the endogenous match 
rate, the product of the meeting rate µ  times the probability that a meeting will result in 
a match. 
Equilibrium 
BRW prove the existence of a unique, symmetric, stationary equilibrium of the game for 
two situations: (1) a city of fixed population and (2) an “open” city where population is 
endogenously determined. We explore the latter equilibrium, taking into account our 
                                                 
1 In our empirical specification, A reflects the utilization of inputs other than labor plus any factors external 
to the firm. 
2 This assumption on production technology is sufficient to satisfy the conditions for assortative matching 
characterized in Shimer and Smith (2000).  
3 Let d  denote the Euclidean distance from the agent’s own type and his ideal partner. It is sufficient to 
assume there exists a value  x d ≤  such that  () 0 yx = . 
4 Note that the meeting technology exhibits increasing returns. BRW argue that the findings of empirical 
studies are consistent with this assumption, but they also point out that their results do not depend on this 
assumption.   Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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assumption about the properties of expected output. Note that uniqueness follows from 
the fact that agents are distributed uniformly over the type space.5  
We begin by computing the steady-state value functions holding population 
constant and assuming that agents choose symmetric strategies. The flow value of being 
matched to an agent whose type is of distance x from one’s own is: 
ˆˆ (, ,) () ( ,) , mU m rV x U Ay x V U V δπ δ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣ ⎦  
which consists of the instantaneous rate of inventions generated by the current match plus 
the capital loss associated with the cessation of the match, discounted by the arrival rate 
of the exogenous separation shock.  
The agent does not know the exact type of his next partner, so  u V  is calculated as 
an expected value taking into account the agent’s selectivity δ . The next match does not 
arrive immediately after the current one is dissolved, so  u V  also reflects the expected 
amount of time before meeting a suitable partner, and this depends on both U and δ . 
More explicitly: 
(1)  [ ] (,) (,) (,) (,) , Um U rV U U V U V U δ βδ δ δ =−  
which is simply the discounted present value of the capital gain resulting from the next 
match. Note that  m V  is derived by integrating  ˆ
m V  over  [0, ] x δ ∈ , holding constant both U 
and δ . Thus 
(2)  [ ] (,) () (,) (,) , mU m rV U Ay V U V U δ δπ δ δ =+ −   








=− = ⋅ ∫∫   
where f(x) and 1( ) F δ −  are  the pdf and cdf, respectively, of the distribution of worker 
locations. The equality with the right-hand side of the expression follows from our 
assumption that workers are distributed uniformly over a circle of unit circumference.  














First Order Conditions. Agents that are currently matched enjoy the proceeds of the 
match until it is dissolved. Unmatched agents are engaged in search and must decide 
                                                 
5 The closed city version of BRW can be mapped to a special case of the model in Burdett and Wright 
(1998), where agents’ payoffs from prospective matches are symmetric. Proposition 2 of that paper shows 
that if the distribution over types is log-concave, there is only one steady-state equilibrium. Proposition 4 
shows this holds even where the matching function exhibits increasing returns. Uniqueness is preserved in 
the open city version of the model because congestion costs are monotonically increasing in population. Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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whether to match with the unmatched agents they meet. They choose δ  to maximize 
(,) U rV U δ . The associated first order condition is 











Holding constant U and the selectivity of other agents, becoming less selective (raising 
δ ) increases the arrival rate of the next partner (0 ) β δ ∂ ∂>  but reduces the expected 
income generated in the next match (0 ) . y δ ∂ ∂<     
Because agents’ types are distributed uniformly over the unit circle and we assume that 
matches of identical agents are unproductive,  (, ) 4 () UU β δδ µ = . This allows us to 













where  () y δ  represents the output generated by a marginal match and η  is the elasticity 
of average output with respect to increases in δ .  
Lemma 1:  There exists an interior solution to the worker’s optimization problem 
characterized by the equality in (5). 
Proof: Existence follows from the fact that  () y δ  ,  () y δ   and β  are continuous and 
differentiable. If we take the limit as δ → 0, holding U constant, the right-hand side of 
(5) converges to 1 while the left-hand side converges to 0. Conversely, if we take the 
limit as δ δ → , the right-hand side of (5) converges to 0, while the left-hand side 
converges to a value that is strictly greater than zero. Finally, note that the second order 
condition is simply [ ] () 0 ry πβ βδ δ ′ ++ <.■ 
The left-hand side of (5) reflects agents’ discount rate and the rate of turnover 
between the states of being matched and unmatched. The first order condition implies 
that when the match rate β  is relatively large, the ratio of marginal to average output is 
close to one. The following lemma shows that if  () yx   is log-concave, relatively large 
values of β  are associated with relatively small values of δ . This establishes the 
intuition that, in equilibrium, a higher arrival rate of matches is associated with more 
selectivity (lower values of δ ) even though  0
U βδ ∂ ∂> .  
Lemma 2: If  () yx   is strictly log-concave, η  is strictly increasing in x. 
Proof:  This follows directly from the definition of  () y δ  , which is the expected value of 
output, conditional on the level of selectivity δ . Taking first and second derivatives of 
() () Ln y δ  , we have 
1( )












   [] 2
1
( ( )) (1 )( ) ; Ln y δ ηη ε η
δ
′′ =− − −   Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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where  () () yy ε δδ δ ′ ≡−  is the elasticity of marginal output with respect to agents’ 









A necessary characteristic of the production function, then, is that marginal output falls 
proportionately more rapidly than average output as δ  rises. In addition, the first order 
condition implies that  1 η ≤ .6 But these are sufficient conditions for our proof as  
() () ( )





δδ ηδ δ δ δ
δ ηεη
δδ δ δ δ
⎧⎫ ∂− ′ ⎡⎤ ∂−




  In steady state the instantaneous measure of agents finding matches is just equal 
to the measure of agents whose matches are terminated:  (,) . UU M β δπ =  Substituting 
forβ  and  , M  we can solve a quadratic equation in U. One root is positive: 
(1 ) 8 U π λα δ =−  where  11 6 1 N λα δ π =+ ≥ . The corresponding match rate is 
(,) ( 1 ) 2 U β δπ λ =−. 
Equilibrium Population Mass. To close the model, we formalize the worker’s 
participation constraint: 
(7) ( , ) , u rV U C w N δ + ≥⋅  
where agents take U and the selectivity of other agents as given.7 C represents the utility 
derived from the available public goods, net of any lump sum taxes used to finance them. 
We assume  0 C ≥ . The last term,  , wN ⋅ represents the loss of utility that results from 
congestion, including the rise in costs that result as scarce local inputs are bid up or 
depreciate more rapidly.  
  Taken together, (3) and (5) imply that  ( , ) ( ) u rV U Ay δ δ = . In other words, the 
flow value of being an unmatched agent is just equal to the output generated by the 
marginal match. In equilibrium (7) is satisfied with equality, so  ( ) () NA y C w δ =+ . 
This in turn implies that 
() ( ) (,) 11 6 () 1 .
2
UA y C w
π
βδ α δ δ π =+ + −  
Comparative Static Results for Agents’ Selectivity and Population 
We can substitute the preceding expression for β  into our first order condition and 
derive comparative static results based on a single equation. 
                                                 
6 We know there are values of δ  where this condition holds because 
0 Lim ( ) (0). yy
δ δ
→ =   
7 The net benefit of living outside the city is normalized to zero. Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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Proposition 1:  δ  is decreasing in α , A, and C, but increasing in w and π .  
Corollary:  N is increasing in α , A, and C, but decreasing in w and π .  
In words, agents become more selective in response to an increase in the efficiency of the 
matching technology, the average productivity of matches, or local public goods. Agents 
become less selective in response to an increase in congestion costs or the separation rate. 
Proof:  For simplicity, we present the comparative static results in terms of elasticities. 






ηη φ ε η
λλ αδ
∂ +⎧+ ⎫ ⎛⎞⎛⎞ ⋅= − −+− < ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
  
where  () () () Ay Ay C φδ δ δ ′ =− +  is the elasticity of population with respect to changes 
in δ . We do not wish to rule out the possibility that  1 φ > , so we must verify that the 
denominator in the preceding expression is indeed positive. We begin by noting that 
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which is positive if  () y δ   is strictly log concave.  
Next, we consider the effect of increasing w, the coefficient on population that reflects 








ηη φ ε η
λλ δπ δ
∂∂ +⎧+ ⎫ ⎛⎞⎛⎞ ⋅= ⋅= −+− > ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
 
This is also the expression for the elasticity of δ  with respect to changes in the 








ηη φ ε η
λδ λ δ
⎛⎞ ∂ +⎧ + ⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⋅= − ⋅ −+− < ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ⎝⎠
 
where the extra term in the numerator is the elasticity of population with respect to A. 
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λδ λ δ
⎛⎞ ∂ +⎧ + ⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⋅= − ⋅ −+− < ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ⎝⎠
 
where the extra term in the numerator is the elasticity of population with respect to C. Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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The participation constraint (7) can be rewritten as  () Ay C wN δ + = . Thus 
equilibrium population is inversely related to δ , which proves the corollary. ■ 
Comparative Static Results for Per Capita Output and Population Mass 
Here we present the main results: 
Proposition 2:    Per capita output of inventions is increasing in α , A, and C, but 
decreasing in w and π . 
Corollary:  Per capita output of inventions is higher in cities with a larger population 
mass. 
Proof:  Per capita output is the product of the share of the population that is matched and 
the average productivity of matches: 
1








− ⎛⎞ Φ ≡ ⋅=⋅= ⋅ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠
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The first two terms reflect the change in the share of agents matched at any given time 
() M N . These reflect changes in the intensive margin (holding N constant, does M rise 
or fall?) and the extensive margin (holding constant ( ) M N , does N rise or fall?). The 
last term reflects the change in expected output per match, characterized in the previous 
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Finally, consider the effect of an increase in the utility lost due to congestion as 
population increases w (the effect of an increase in the separation rate π  takes on exactly 
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⎧+ ⎫ ⎛⎞ −+ − ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ Φ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ⋅= − + − −⋅ ⋅ = <
+ Φ∂ ⎛⎞ −+− ⎜⎟
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The corollary then follows from the previous corollary. ■ 
Comparative Static Results for Changes in Land Area  
In BRW population varies, while the physical size of the city is fixed. In other words, in 
terms of the model, changes in population and density are the same.   
  But we also wish to consider the possibility that exogenous increases in land area 
might reduce density and therefore per capita output. This will occur if an insufficient 
number of workers respond to the reduction in congestion by moving into the city. To 
explore this possibility, we assume that the efficiency of the meeting rate parameter α  
and congestion coefficient w are decreasing in city land area L. We show the following: 
Proposition 3:   Increasing  L decreases (increases) δ , and Φ if α  is more (less) 
sensitive to changes in L than is w.   
Proof:  We derive the elasticity of per capita output with respect to changes in land area 
in the same manner as we did in Propositions 2 and 3: 
()
() ( )
2 1( 1 ) () ()
2.
1 () () 12
dL L L w L
dL L w L
λη η α
λ λα ηφ ε η
λ
⎧ ⎫
⎪ ⎪ +− ′′ ⎛⎞ Φ ⎪ ⎪ ⋅= − + ⎨ ⎬ ⎜⎟ + Φ ⎛⎞ ⎝⎠ ⎪ ⎪ −+ − ⎜⎟ ⎪ ⎪ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
■ 
  In the model, increasing land area has two effects on workers’ incentive to 
migrate to the city. The first effect is a reduction in the costs associated with congestion, 
which, all else equal, induces additional migration. The second is a reduction in expected Matching Externalities & Inventive Productivity 
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income that results from waiting longer for the next meeting with an unmatched worker. 
All else equal, this would discourage workers from entering the city. 
  It turns out that, in the absence of a fully specified model for the supply of 
developed land, we cannot sign the effect a priori. If the reduction in congestion costs is 
sufficiently large relative to the decline in the efficiency of meeting technology, both 
density and per capita output rises. But if the reduction in congestion costs is relatively 
small, density and per capita output will fall. 
Conclusion 
This paper develops a generalized version of the labor market matching model of Berliant 
Reed and Wang (2006) that can explain why more dense cities (measured in jobs per 
square mile) would be more productive in the innovation process, as documented in 
Carlino, Chatterjee, and Hunt (2006).  
We show that the results of BRW hold for more general functional forms as long 
as output is log concave with respect to deviations from the ideal match. We also show 
that the interior equilibrium remains unique. By explicitly distinguishing the mass of 
agents and land area, we are able to generate an additional result: an exogenous increase 
in available land increases per capita output whenever the meeting rate between 
unmatched workers is less sensitive to a decline in density than are the congestion costs 
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